论文信息 - Nash solution and timing of bargaining

Nash solution and timing of bargaining

Abstract We analyze bargaining problems with unknown feasible sets and known disagreement points. Two characterizations of the Nash solution are presented by formulating axioms specifying how bargaining solutions should respond under such circumstances.

Youngsub Chun

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