The role of forgetting in the evolution and learning of language

Lewis signalling games illustrate how language might evolve from random behaviour. The probability of evolving an optimal signalling language is, in part, a function of what learning strategy the agents use. Here we investigate three learning strategies, each of which allows agents to forget old experience. In each case, we find that forgetting increases the probability of evolving an optimal language. It does this by making it less likely that past partial success will continue to reinforce suboptimal practice. The learning strategies considered here show how forgetting past experience can promote learning in the context of games with suboptimal equilibria.

[1]  A. Roth,et al.  Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term* , 1995 .

[2]  Rudi van Drunen,et al.  Localization of Random Pulse Point Sources Using Physically Implementable Search Algorithms , 2020, Optoelectronics, Instrumentation and Data Processing.

[3]  David Lewis Convention: A Philosophical Study , 1986 .

[4]  J. Sobel,et al.  STRATEGIC INFORMATION TRANSMISSION , 1982 .

[5]  M. Nowak,et al.  A strategy of win-stay, lose-shift that outperforms tit-for-tat in the Prisoner's Dilemma game , 1993, Nature.

[6]  Jeffrey A. Barrett,et al.  Dynamic Partitioning and the Conventionality of Kinds* , 2007, Philosophy of Science.

[7]  Stanislav Volkov,et al.  Learning to signal: Analysis of a micro-level reinforcement model , 2009 .

[8]  O. L. Tinklepaugh An experimental study of representative factors in monkeys. , 1928 .

[9]  B. Skyrms Evolution of the social contract , 1996 .

[10]  Andreas Blume,et al.  Evolutionary Stability in Games of Communication , 1993 .

[11]  A. Roth,et al.  Predicting How People Play Games: Reinforcement Learning in Experimental Games with Unique, Mixed Strategy Equilibria , 1998 .

[12]  Simon M. Huttegger Evolution and the Explanation of Meaning* , 2007, Philosophy of Science.

[13]  Josef Hofbauer,et al.  Learning in games with unstable equilibria , 2005, J. Econ. Theory.

[14]  Patrick Grim,et al.  Making meaning happen , 2004, J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell..

[15]  Tom Stonier Information and Meaning , 1997 .

[16]  W. Strange Evolution of language. , 1984, JAMA.

[17]  Kevin J. S. Zollman Talking to Neighbors: The Evolution of Regional Meaning* , 2005, Philosophy of Science.

[18]  Jeffrey A. Barrett,et al.  Numerical Simulations of the Lewis Signaling Game: Learning Strategies, Pooling Equilibria, and the Evolution of Grammar , 2006 .

[19]  Christina Pawlowitsch,et al.  Why evolution does not always lead to an optimal signaling system , 2008, Games Econ. Behav..

[20]  K. Wärneryd Cheap Talk, Coordination, and Evolutionary Stability , 1993 .

[21]  B. Skyrms Presidential Address: Signals , 2008, Philosophy of Science.

[22]  Bereby-Meyer,et al.  On Learning To Become a Successful Loser: A Comparison of Alternative Abstractions of Learning Processes in the Loss Domain. , 1998, Journal of mathematical psychology.

[23]  Jeffrey A. Barrett,et al.  The Evolution of Coding in Signaling Games , 2009 .

[24]  W. Harms,et al.  Information and Meaning in Evolutionary Processes , 2004 .

[25]  Kevin J. S. Zollman,et al.  Evolutionary dynamics of Lewis signaling games: signaling systems vs. partial pooling , 2007, Synthese.

[26]  H. Robbins Some aspects of the sequential design of experiments , 1952 .

[27]  Simon M. Huttegger Evolutionary Explanations of Indicatives and Imperatives , 2007 .

[28]  R. Herrnstein On the law of effect. , 1970, Journal of the experimental analysis of behavior.