Success and decisiveness on proper symmetric games

This paper provides a complete study for the possible rankings of success and decisiveness for individuals in symmetric voting systems, assuming anonymous and independent probability distributions. It is proved that for any pair of symmetric voting systems it is always possible to rank success and decisiveness in opposite order whenever the common probability of voting for “acceptance” is big enough. On the contrary, for probability values lower than one-half it is not possible to reverse the ranking of these two measures.

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