How Do Unisex Rating Regulations Affect Gender Differences in Insurance Premiums?

As of 21 December 2012, the use of gender as an insurance rating category is prohibited in the EU. Any remaining pricing disparities between men and women will now be traced back to the reasonable pricing of characteristics that happen to differ between the groups or to the pricing of characteristics that differ between sexes in a way that proxies for gender. Using data from an automobile insurer, we analyse how the standard industry approach of simply omitting gender from the pricing formula, which allows for proxy effects, differs from the benchmark for what prices would look like if direct gender effects were removed and other variables did not adjust as proxies. We find that the standard industry approach will likely be influenced by proxy effects for younger and older drivers. Our method can simply be applied to almost any setting where a regulator is considering a uniform pricing reform.

[1]  O. Riedel,et al.  Zur Bedeutung der sekundären Prämiendifferenzierung bei Unisex-Tarifen in der Krankenversicherung , 2005 .

[2]  R. Thomas Some Novel Perspectives on Risk Classification , 2007 .

[3]  J. Winter,et al.  Asymmetric Information in the Market for Automobile Insurance: Evidence from Germany , 2014 .

[4]  R. Puelz,et al.  Implications for unisex statutes and risk-pooling: The costs of gender and underwriting attributes in the automobile insurance market , 1993 .

[5]  Hato Schmeiser,et al.  Unisex Insurance Pricing: Consumers’ Perception and Market Implications , 2014 .

[6]  Manuela Alcañiz,et al.  Implications of Unisex Assumptions in the Analysis of Longevity for Insurance Portfolios , 2013, MS.

[7]  K. Crocker,et al.  The theory of risk classification , 2013 .

[8]  O. Riedel Unisex Tariffs in Health Insurance , 2006 .

[9]  Mattias Polborn,et al.  Advantageous Effects of Regulatory Adverse Selection in the Life Insurance Market , 2006 .

[10]  K. Podczeck,et al.  Adverse selection and regulation in health insurance markets. , 1996, Journal of health economics.

[11]  Devin G. Pope,et al.  Implementing Anti-discrimination Policies in Statistical Profiling Models , 2011 .

[12]  Bev Dahlby Adverse Selection and Statistical Discrimination , 1983 .

[13]  Jörn Sass,et al.  Insurance markets and unisex tariffs: is the European Court of Justice improving or destroying welfare? , 2014 .

[14]  Peter Siegelman Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat , 2004 .

[15]  G. Dionne,et al.  Automobile Insurance Ratemaking In The Presence Of Asymmetric Information , 1992 .

[16]  L. Nesheim Hedonic price functions , 2006 .

[17]  Yves Thiery,et al.  Fairness and Equality in Insurance Classification , 2006 .