The economics of nuclear accident law

Statutes restrict the application of common tort law to accidents at nuclear power plants in Canada, the U.S., and other countries. The statutes transfer to the operator of a nuclear plant liability that would otherwise be placed on input suppliers and in return limit the liability of the operator. This essay addresses the impact on safety incentives of nuclear accident law, with broader implications for the design of incentive systems that combine regulation and liability rules.

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