On (un)knots and dynamics in games

We extend Kohlberg and Mertens' (1986) structure theorem concerning the Nash equilibrium correspondence to show that its graph is not only homeomorphic to the underlying space of games but that it is also unknotted. This is then shown to have some basic consequences for dynamics whose rest points are Nash equilibria.

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