Can "Radical" Simulation Theories Explain Psychological Concept Acquisition?

This paper examines the response offered by Robert Gordon to the question how an interpreter can reach the correct content of others'psychological states (beliefs & desires). It exposes the main problems raised by Gordon's proposal, and provides a tentative solution that emphasizes the structuring role of counterfactual reasoning in embedding simulations and deriving facts that are holding across them.

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