Reliability for degrees of belief

We often evaluate belief-forming processes, agents, or entire belief states for reliability. This is normally done with the assumption that beliefs are all-or-nothing. How does such evaluation go when we’re considering beliefs that come in degrees? I consider a natural answer to this question that focuses on the degree of truth-possession had by a set of beliefs. I argue that this natural proposal is inadequate, but for an interesting reason. When we are dealing with all-or-nothing belief, high reliability leads to high levels of truth-possession. However, when it comes to degrees of belief, reliability and truth-possession part ways. The natural answer thus fails to be a good way to evaluate degrees of belief for reliability. I propose and develop an alternative method based on the notion of calibration, suggested by Frank Ramsey, which does not have this problem and consider why we should care about such assessments of reliability even if they are not tied directly to truth-possession.

[1]  A. Bird.  Is Evidence Non‐Inferential? , 2004 .

[2]  Marc Lange,et al.  Calibration and the Epistemological Role of Bayesian Conditionalization , 1999 .

[3]  Duncan Pritchard,et al.  The Nature and Value of Knowledge: Three Investigations , 2010 .

[4]  G. Blattenberger,et al.  Separating the Brier Score into Calibration and Refinement Components: A Graphical Exposition , 1985 .

[5]  B. D. Finetti,et al.  Probability, induction and statistics : the art of guessing , 1979 .

[6]  Jonathan Weisberg,et al.  Commutativity or Holism? A Dilemma for Conditionalizers , 2009, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

[7]  Bas C. van Fraassen,et al.  Calibration: A Frequency Justification for Personal Probability , 1983 .

[8]  Tamar Szabó Gendler,et al.  Oxford Studies in Epistemology , 2005 .

[9]  L. J. Savage.  Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations , 1971 .

[10]  Weisberg Jonathan.  Varieties of Bayesianism , 2011 .

[11]  D. Armstrong,et al.  Belief, Truth and Knowledge. , 1974 .

[12]  Evidential externalism , 2012 .

[13]  P. Maher.  Subjective and Objective Confirmation , 1996, Philosophy of Science.

[14]  Allan Gibbard,et al.  Rational Credence and the Value of Truth , 2006 .

[15]  A. Goldman.  Strong and Weak Justification , 1988 .

[16]  Joseph Lebacqz,et al.  SUBJECTIVE AND OBJECTIVE , 1967 .

[17]  Frederick F. Schmitt.  Veritistic value , 2000 .

[18]  Alvin I. Goldman,et al.  What is Justified Belief , 1979 .

[19]  James M. Joyce.  Accuracy and Coherence: Prospects for an Alethic Epistemology of Partial Belief , 2009 .

[20]  A. H. Murphy.  A New Vector Partition of the Probability Score , 1973 .

[21]  Stephen E. Fienberg,et al.  The Comparison and Evaluation of Forecasters. , 1983 .

[22]  F. Ramsey.  Truth and Probability , 2016 .

[23]  A. H. Murphy,et al.  Scalar and Vector Partitions of the Probability Score: Part I. Two-State Situation , 1972 .

[24]  Peter Baumann,et al.  Reliabilism: Modal, Probabilistic Or Contextualist , 2009 .

[25]  Timothy Williamson,et al.  Knowledge and Its Limits , 2000 .

[26]  H. Leitgeb,et al.  An Objective Justification of Bayesianism II: The Consequences of Minimizing Inaccuracy* , 2010, Philosophy of Science.

[27]  Moshe Shaked,et al.  An economic model of scientific activity and truth acquisition , 1991 .

[28]  Teddy Seidenfeld,et al.  Calibration, Coherence, and Scoring Rules , 1985, Philosophy of Science.

[29]  Alvin I. Goldman,et al.  Reliabilism and Contemporary Epistemology: Essays , 2012 .

[30]  R. Neta.  What Evidence Do You Have? , 2008, The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.

[31]  D. M. Armstrong,et al.  Belief, Truth And Knowledge , 1973 .

[32]  David Wallace,et al.  Justifying Conditionalization: Conditionalization Maximizes Expected Epistemic Utility , 2006 .

[33]  F. Sanders.  On Subjective Probability Forecasting , 1963 .

[34]  Dov M. Gabbay,et al.  Handbook of the history of logic , 2004 .

[35]  Jaines M. Joyce.  A Nonpragmatic Vindication of Probabilism , 1998, Philosophy of Science.

[36]  A. Goldman.  Epistemic Relativism and Reasonable Disagreement , 2010 .

[37]  A. Goldman.  Epistemology and Cognition , 1986 .

[38]  Nicholas Silins.  Deception and evidence , 2005 .

[39]  A. Goldman.  Knowledge in a Social World , 1999 .

[40]  Hilary Kornblith,et al.  Justification and Knowledge , 1979 .

[41]  F. Ramsey.  The Foundations of Mathematics and Other Logical Essays , 2001 .

[42]  Richard Pettigrew,et al.  An Objective Justification of Bayesianism I: Measuring Inaccuracy* , 2010, Philosophy of Science.

[43]  F. Huber,et al.  Degrees of Belief , 2009 .

[44]  C. Aitken,et al.  The logic of decision , 2014 .

[45]  Nicholas Silins.  Deception and Evidence1 , 2005 .

[46]  Bryson Brown.  Adjunction and Aggregation , 1999 .

[47]  Stewart M Cohen.  Justification and truth , 1984 .

[48]  G. Brier.  VERIFICATION OF FORECASTS EXPRESSED IN TERMS OF PROBABILITY , 1950 .