Sceptical Confusions About Rule-Following

Saul Kripke's Wittgenstein: On Rules and Private Language seems certain to restore renewed vigour to the debate over the meaning and significance of Wittgenstein's discussion of rule-following. Kripke's interpretation rests on two fundamental exegetical claims: first, that Wittgenstein unleashes a powerful sceptical attack on the concept of rule-following, and second, that he does so in order to encourage us to adopt an antirealist 'community-view' of rule-following. By forcing us to consider Wittgenstein's intentions in respect to each of these issues, Kripke's interpretation will indeed serve to bring Wittgenstein's argument into much sharper focus. Kripke insists that, even though 'Wittgenstein never avows, and almost surely would not avow, the label "sceptic"', still 'Wittgenstein has invented a new form of scepticism. . . the most radical and original sceptical problem that philosophy has seen to date'.' On Kripke's reading, Wittgenstein has ruthlessly mounted a sceptical campaign in order to expose us to the extraordinary possibility that: