Reinforcement Learning in Markovian Evolutionary Games

A high voltage, low current electric signal is placed across the electrode and workpiece in an electro erosion machining circuit in accordance with the disclosure to provide improved machining. The high voltage, low current signal may be continuous or pulsed and if pulsed, it may be initiated by intermittent low voltage, high current electro erosion machining pulses or independent therefrom. The high voltage, low current signals, if pulsed, may also be initiated prior to, at the same time as or subsequent to the low voltage, high current electro machining pulses and may be of the same or opposite polarity. If the high voltage, low current signal is pulsed, the frequency and pulse width may be varied. A capacitor may be selectively placed across the electrode and workpiece during electro erosion machining in conjunction with the high voltage, low current signal to further improve the machining characteristics of the low voltage, high current electro erosion machining signal.

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