Properties of Scoring Auctions

This Paper studies scoring auctions, a procedure commonly used to buy differentiated products: suppliers submit offers on all dimensions of the good (price, level of non monetary attributes), and these are evaluated using a scoring rule. We provide a systematic analysis of equilibrium behaviour in scoring auctions when suppliers’ private information is multidimensional (characterization of equilibrium behaviour and expected utility equivalence) and show that scoring auctions dominate several other commonly used procedures for buying differentiated products.

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