Dual Purpose Measures

We examine a firm's choice of a measurement system designed to serve two distinct objectives; provide forward-looking information about future firm productivity and ex post information about past managerial performance. A firm can have two separate measurements, one for each purpose, or a single measure that simultaneously serves both objectives. In a two-period principal-agent model, we illustrate how implicit incentives can lead firms to prefer a single dual-purpose measure.

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