Evolutionary equilibrium in Tullock contests: spite and overdissipation

Tullock's analysis of rent-seeking as a contest is reconsidered from an evolutionary point of view. We show that evolutionary stable behavior in a Tullock contest exists and differs from behavior in Nash equilibrium. Evolutionary stable behavior in these contests is robust in a strong sense and may entail overdissipation of the contested rent.

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