Assessing the Price Effects of Airline Alliances on Complementary Routes

This paper investigates the impacts of complementary alliance on airfares. The conventional wisdom argues that complementary airline alliances reduce airfares for passengers on the flow-through routes as a result of the elimination of double marginalization and efficiency gain. On the other hand, since complementary alliances help improve connecting services through one-stop check-in, better schedule coordination, etc., passengers are willing to pay higher prices for the enhanced services. That is, complementary alliances have both positive and negative effects on airfares for flow-through tickets that counteract each other. The net impact, therefore, is uncertain, a priori. Our theoretical model shows that the overall effects of complementary alliances on airfares depend on the relative strengths of the airfare reducing effects due to cooperative pricing setting and the increased willingness to pay for services improvements. Our empirical analysis based on data from the North trans-Pacific markets in October 2007 finds that member airlines of Star Alliance and Skyteam Alliance appear to charge significantly higher prices for through-tickets than the sum of segment fares on complementary routes, whereas for oneworld Alliance members, the upward and downward effects on airfares seem to counterbalance each other. Moreover, the price markup for through ticket is higher for business passengers than for leisure passengers.

[1]  Mark Hansen,et al.  The Consequences of Strategic Alliances Between International Airlines: The Case of Swissair and SAS , 1993 .

[2]  Peter Morrell,et al.  Mergers and Acquisitions in Aviation – Management and Economic Perspectives on the Size of Airlines , 2012 .

[3]  Jan K. Brueckner,et al.  International Airfares in the Age of Alliances: The Effect of Codesharing and Antitrust Immunity , 2001 .

[4]  Jong-Hun Park,et al.  The effects of airline alliances on markets and economic welfare , 1997 .

[5]  Xiang Wan,et al.  Assessing the Price Effects of Airline Alliances on Parallel Routes , 2009 .

[6]  Yongmin Chen,et al.  Vertical contracting between airlines: An equilibrium analysis of codeshare alliances , 2007 .

[7]  Achim I. Czerny Code-sharing, price discrimination and welfare losses , 2009 .

[8]  Jan K. Brueckner,et al.  The economics of international codesharing: an analysis of airline alliances , 2001 .

[9]  Jan K. Brueckner,et al.  The Price Effects of International Airline Alliances* , 2000, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[10]  Darin Lee,et al.  Domestic Code Sharing, Alliances, and Airfares in the U.S. Airline Industry , 2007, The Journal of Law and Economics.

[11]  Jan K. Brueckner,et al.  A MODEL OF SCHEDULING IN AIRLINE NETWORKS: HOW A HUB-AND-SPOKE SYSTEM AFFECTS FLIGHT FREQUENCY, FARES AND WELFARE , 2001 .

[12]  Jong-Hun Park,et al.  An Empirical Analysis of Global Airline Alliances: Cases in North Atlantic Markets , 2000 .

[13]  Philip G. Gayle On the efficiency of codeshare contracts between airlines: is double marginalization eliminated? , 2013 .