A Cognitive Framework for Mate Choice and Species Recognition

Mating decisions contribute to both the fitness of individuals and the emergence of evolutionary diversity, yet little is known about their cognitive architecture. We propose a simple model that describes how preferences are translated into decisions and how seemingly disparate patterns of preference can emerge from a single perceptual process. The model proposes that females use error‐prone estimates of attractiveness to select mates based on a simple decision rule: choose the most attractive available male that exceeds some minimal criterion. We test the model in the túngara frog, a well‐characterized species with an apparent dissociation between mechanisms of mate choice and species recognition. As suggested by our model results, we find that a mate attraction feature alters assessments of species status. Next, we compare female preferences in one‐choice and two‐choice tests, contexts thought to emphasize species recognition and mate choice, respectively. To do so, we use the model to generate maximum‐likelihood estimators of preference strengths from empirical data. We find that a single representation of preferences is sufficient to explain response probabilities in both contexts across a wide range of stimuli. In this species, mate choice and species recognition are accurately and simply summarized by our model. While the findings resolve long‐standing anomalies, they also illustrate how models of choice can bridge theoretical and empirical treatments of animal decisions. The data demonstrate a remarkable congruity of perceptual processes across contexts, tasks, and taxa.