Cooperation through the Endogenous Evolution of Social Structure

A number of recent models demonstrate sustained and high levels of cooperation within evolutionary systems supported by the endogenous evolution of social structure. These dynamic social structures co-evolve, under certain conditions, to support a form of group selection in which highly cooperative groups replace less cooperative groups. A necessary condition is that agents are free to move between groups and can create new groups more quickly than existing groups become invaded by defecting agents who do not cooperate.

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