On ε-equilibrium point in a noncooperative n-person game

Abstract In this paper, we describe a noncooperative n -person game in strategic form (or normal form) and introduce e-equilibrium point. We give mainly the characterization of such an e-equilibrium point by applying Ekeland's theorem.

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