Privacy-Preserving Strategyproof Auction Mechanisms for Resource Allocation in Wireless Communications

In recent years, auction theory has been extensively studied and many state-of-art solutions have been proposed aiming at allocating scarce resources (e.g. spectrum resources in wireless communications). Unfortunately, most of these studies assume that the auctioneer is always trustworthy in the sealed-bid auctions, which is not always true in a more realistic scenario. On the other hand, performance guarantee, such as social efficiency maximization, is also crucial for auction mechanism design. Therefore, the goal of this work is to design a series of strategyproof and privacy preserving auction mechanisms that maximize the social efficiency. To make the designed auction model more general, we allow the bidders to express their preferences about multiple items, which is often regarded as the multi-unit auction. As computing an optimal allocation in multi-unit auction is NP-hard, we design a set of near optimal allocation mechanisms with privacy preserving separately for: (1) The auction aims at identical multi-items trading; and (2) The auction aims at distinct multi-items trading, which is also known as combinatorial auction. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to design strategyproof multi-unit auction mechanisms with privacy preserving, which maximize the social efficiency at the same time. The evaluation results corroborate our theoretical analysis, and show that our proposed methods achieve low computation and communication complexity.