论文信息 - Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism

Introduction PART 1: PHENOMENAL KNOWLEDGE 1. What RoboMary Knows 2. So This is What it's Like: a Defense of the Ability Hypothesis 3. The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism 4. Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? 5. What is This Thing You Call Color: Can a Totally Color-Blind Person Know about Color? PART 2: PHENOMENAL CONCEPTS 6. What is a Phenomenal Concept? 7. Phenomenal and Perceptual Conepts 8. Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint 9. Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap 10. Direct Reference and Dancing Qualia 11. Property Dualism, Phenomenal Concepts, and the Semantic Premise 12. Max Black's Objection to Mind-Brain Identity 13. Grasping Phenomenal Properties

Torin Alter | S. Walter | Sven Walter | Torin Alter

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