论文信息 - Long-run dynamics of queues: Stability and chaos

Long-run dynamics of queues: Stability and chaos

We analyze the long-run dynamics of queues in which customers undergo self-selection. We describe the structure and local stability of equilibria for various capacity adjustment procedures and solve the problem of global stability for the limiting cases. The intermediate cases can be quite complicated. We show that one such case leads to chaotic dynamics.

Eric J. Friedman | Adam S. Landsberg

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