Incentives and performance in the presence of wealth effects and endogenous risk

Abstract Two of the most widely tested predictions of agency theory are that there exists a negative association between an agent's pay-performance sensitivity (PPS) and the risk of output, and that PPS enhances performance. Empirical evidence has been mixed. This paper proposes a new utility function and develops a model that introduces a “wealth effect” and also allows the agent to control the (idiosyncratic) risk of output. When risk is endogenous, the paper shows that the two predictions may not hold.

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