Exploring norm establishment in organizations using an extended axelrod model and with two new metanorms

We examine norms establishment within organizations using an extended Axelrod model. Organizations have distinct differences in structure and function from other social groupings which makes for interest in this question. We examine two types of organizational norms and propose two new metanorms. The Walk-The-Talk (WTT) Metanorm is based on the intuition that the team leader who regularly violates a norm will, by setting a poor example, weaken the norm. Similarly the leader who conforms to the norm will strengthen the norm. The Corrective-Action Metanorm (CA) models the corrective action a team leader may take if she sees norm weakening. The metanorm is moderated by a personality variable which we call Introspectiveness. We show the differences in norm establishment and collapse without the metanorms, with only WTT at play and with both metanorms at play. We show how the WTT acts as a positive feedback loop as conformance triggers more conformance, violation more violations while the CA metanorm acts as the negative feedback loop trying to move things towards ideal norm states. We close with a look at the relation between team size and norm compliance and show how large teams appear to prevent norm collapse.

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