ALTERNATIVE CALIBRATION AND AUCTION INSTITUTIONS FOR PREDICTING CONSUMER WILLINGESS TO PAY FOR NONGENETICALLY MODIFIED CORN CHIPS
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Jayson L. Lusk | Darrell R. Mark | J. Lusk | D. Mark | M. Scott Daniel | Christine L. Lusk | M. Daniel
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