On the Efficiency of Connection Charges—Part I: A Stochastic Framework

This two-part paper addresses the design of retail electricity tariffs for distribution systems with distributed energy resources such as solar power and storage. In particular, the optimal design of dynamic two-part tariffs for a regulated monopolistic retailer is considered, where the retailer faces exogenous wholesale electricity prices and fixed costs on the one hand and stochastic demands with intertemporal price dependencies on the other. Part I presents a general framework and analysis for revenue adequate retail tariffs with advanced notification, dynamic prices, and uniform connection charges. It is shown that the optimal two-part tariff consists of a dynamic price that may not match the expected wholesale price and a connection charge that distributes uniformly among all customers the retailer's fixed costs and a price-volume risk premium. A sufficient condition for the optimality of the derived two-part tariff among the class of arbitrary ex-ante tariffs is obtained. Numerical simulations quantify the substantial welfare gains that the optimal two-part tariff may bring compared to the optimal linear tariff (without connection charge). Part II focuses on the impact of two-part tariffs on the integration of distributed energy resources.

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