论文信息 - A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games

A Bound on the Proportion of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Generic Games

In a generic finite normal form game with 2α + 1 Nash equilibria, at least α of the equilibria are nondegenerate mixed strategy equilibria (that is, they involve randomization by some players).

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