Trust consistency in public data games on complex networks

The trust on network of Chinese public database is involved many factors in sociology, economics, technology, social psychology and so on, which resulted in the complexity of trust mechanism. The construction of trust mechanism plays a decisive role in public data governance via theoretical analysis. In the view of system science, trust is the key feedback control variable of data exchanging in the information structure and function of social economic system, while the emergence variable, not individual variable. In other words, the trust is unexpressed individually or locally, missed the principle of reductionism and belonging to the category of systems. The evolution of the structure and function of the trust in the public data trust game is a typical complex system dynamics process. By systematic approach, this research provides an overall framework for trust mechanisms in the Chinese public database network to reach trust consistency, thereby, improving the quality of Chinese public data products and the credibility of data authority in public sector. The problem of control is studied which betrayal is restricted to limit size of belief, in the viewpoints of public sector bureaucratic behavior, the data trust game and the trust psychological mechanism. One of proposed Byzantine general algorithm is provide for public data game with the "cheap talk", and the trust dynamics equations is set up on the trust overlay network of hierarchical public data game, while the economic and sociological explains of the model conditions and model solving are presented for us to understand this algorithm and model.

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