Load management programs, cross-subsidies and transaction costs: the case of self-rationing

Load management programs are used by electric utilities to reduce the amount of reserve capacity that is required in order to meet peak consumption. Although these programs are generally offered to costumers as alternatives to regular service, economic models of their allocative efficiency have always been based on the implicit assumption that they were the only services available. This paper presents a model in which the consumer has the option to subscribe to regular service or to participate in a particular load management program, called self- rationing.

[1]  The application of marginal cost pricing principles to a hydro-electric system: The case of hydro-Québec☆ , 1985 .

[2]  Daniel F. Spulber OPTIMAL NONLINEAR PRICING AND CONTINGENT CONTRACTS , 1992 .

[3]  Efficient self-rationing of electricity revisited , 1993 .

[4]  Subsidy free pricing of interruptible service contracts , 1995 .

[5]  An aggregate model for energy costs: National product interdependence☆ , 1982 .

[6]  Thomas N. Taylor,et al.  The Long-Run Effects of a Time-of-Use Demand Charge , 1990 .

[7]  Douglas W. Caves,et al.  Econometric analysis of residential time-of-use electricity pricing experiments , 1980 .

[8]  John C. Panzar,et al.  Public utility pricing under risk: the case of self-rationing , 1978 .

[9]  Pricing Priority Service: Theory Versus Utility Practice , 1994 .

[10]  Douglas R. Bohi,et al.  The efficiency of wholesale vs. retail competition in electricity , 1996 .

[11]  Thomas N. Taylor,et al.  A Residential Demand Charge: Evidence from the Duke Power Time-of-Day Pricing Experiment , 1986 .

[12]  Shmuel S. Oren,et al.  Interruption insurance for generation and distribution of electric power , 1990 .

[13]  Edison Tse,et al.  Monopolistic Provision of Congested Service with Incentive-Based Allocation of Priorities , 1989 .

[14]  D. Sibley Public utility pricing under risk: A generalization , 1985 .

[15]  M. Filippini Electricity demand by time of use An application of the household AIDS model , 1995 .

[16]  Welfare-optimal pricing and capacity selection under an ex ante maximum demand charge , 1993 .

[17]  Shmuel S. Oren,et al.  Multilevel demand subscription pricing for electric power , 1986 .

[18]  Daniel F. Spulber Capacity-contingent nonlinear pricing by regulated firms , 1992 .

[19]  Thomas N. Taylor,et al.  Public Utility Pricing under Risk; the Case of Self-Rationing: Comment and Extension , 1987 .

[20]  Robert Wilson Ramsey pricing of priority service , 1989 .

[21]  Chi-Keung Woo,et al.  Efficient electricity pricing with self-rationing , 1990 .

[22]  Joseph A. Doucet,et al.  Onsite Backup Generation and Interruption Insurance for Electricity Distribution , 1991 .

[23]  Maurice Marchand,et al.  Pricing power supplied on an interruptible basis , 1974 .

[24]  Robert B. Wilson Efficient and Competitive Rationing , 1989 .

[25]  Robert Wilson,et al.  Priority Service: Pricing, Investment, and Market Organization , 1987 .

[26]  P. Joskow Restructuring, Competition and Regulatory Reform in the U.S. Electricity Sector , 1997 .

[27]  Stephen J. Brown,et al.  The Theory of Public Utility Pricing , 1986 .