Impact of deterministic and stochastic updates on network reciprocity in the prisoner's dilemma game.

In 2 × 2 prisoner's dilemma games, network reciprocity is one mechanism for adding social viscosity, which leads to cooperative equilibrium. This study introduced an intriguing framework for the strategy update rule that allows any combination of a purely deterministic method, imitation max (IM), and a purely probabilistic one, pairwise Fermi (Fermi-PW). A series of simulations covering the whole range from IM to Fermi-PW reveals that, as a general tendency, the larger fractions of stochastic updating reduce network reciprocity, so long as the underlying lattice contains no noise in the degree of distribution. However, a small amount of stochastic flavor added to an otherwise perfectly deterministic update rule was actually found to enhance network reciprocity. This occurs because a subtle stochastic effect in the update rule improves the evolutionary trail in games having more stag-hunt-type dilemmas, although the same stochastic effect degenerates evolutionary trails in games having more chicken-type dilemmas. We explain these effects by dividing evolutionary trails into the enduring and expanding periods defined by Shigaki et al. [Phys. Rev. E 86, 031141 (2012)].