Rethinking the language of thought.

In this piece, we overview the language of thought (LOT) program, a currently influential theory of the computational nature of thought. We focus on LOT's stance on concepts, computation in the central system, and mental symbols. We emphasize certain longstanding problems arising for the LOT approach, suggesting resolutions to these problems. Many of the solutions involve departures from the standard LOT program, i.e., the LOT program as developed by Jerry Fodor. We close by identifying avenues for future work. WIREs Cogn Sci 2012, 3:153-162. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1155 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.

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