Shapley value for games with externalities and games on graphs
暂无分享,去创建一个
[1] Daniel Gómez,et al. Polynomial calculation of the Shapley value based on sampling , 2009, Comput. Oper. Res..
[2] Cheng-Cheng Hu,et al. An axiomatic characterization of a value for games in partition function form , 2010 .
[3] Peter Borm,et al. The VL control measure for symmetric networks , 2009, Soc. Networks.
[4] A R Sharafat,et al. RECURSIVE CONTRACTION ALGORITHM: A NOVEL AND EFFICIENT GRAPH TRAVERSAL METHOD FOR SCANNING ALL MINIMAL CUT SETS , 2006 .
[5] N. Trinajstic,et al. The Zagreb Indices 30 Years After , 2003 .
[6] Javier Arin,et al. An Axiom System for a Value for Games in Partition Function Form , 2005, IGTR.
[7] David Wettstein,et al. Bidding for the Surplus : A Non-cooperative Approach to the Shapley Value , 2001, J. Econ. Theory.
[8] David Avis,et al. Reverse Search for Enumeration , 1996, Discret. Appl. Math..
[9] Roger B. Myerson,et al. Graphs and Cooperation in Games , 1977, Math. Oper. Res..
[10] G. Owen. VALUES OF GAMES WITH A PRIORI UNIONS , 1977 .
[11] R. Myerson. Values of games in partition function form , 1977 .
[12] Tuomas Sandholm,et al. Anytime coalition structure generation: an average case study , 2000, J. Exp. Theor. Artif. Intell..
[13] S. Vajda,et al. Contributions to the Theory of Games. Volume III. Annals of Mathematics Studies Number 39. Edited by M. Dresher, A. W. Tucker and P. Wolfe. (Princeton University Press) , 1954, The Mathematical Gazette.
[14] Herbert Hamers,et al. Cooperative game theoretic centrality analysis of terrorist networks: The cases of Jemaah Islamiyah and Al Qaeda , 2013, Eur. J. Oper. Res..
[15] L. Shapley. A Value for n-person Games , 1988 .
[16] Isa Emin Hafalir,et al. Efficiency in coalition games with externalities , 2007, Games Econ. Behav..
[17] Noah E. Friedkin,et al. Theoretical Foundations for Centrality Measures , 1991, American Journal of Sociology.
[18] Guillermo Owen,et al. Splitting graphs when calculating Myerson value for pure overhead games , 2004, Math. Methods Oper. Res..
[19] R. Myerson. Conference structures and fair allocation rules , 1978 .
[20] Stephen J. Ressler. Social Network Analysis as an Approach to Combat Terrorism: Past, Present, and Future Research , 2006 .
[21] A. J. Stam. Generation of a Random Partition of a Finite Set by an Urn Model , 1983, J. Comb. Theory, Ser. A.
[22] Michel Grabisch,et al. A coalition formation value for games with externalities , 2011 .
[23] Ben McQuillin,et al. The extended and generalized Shapley value: Simultaneous consideration of coalitional externalities and coalitional structure , 2009, J. Econ. Theory.
[24] J. Hopcroft,et al. Algorithm 447: efficient algorithms for graph manipulation , 1973, CACM.
[25] Sarvapali D. Ramchurn,et al. On coalition formation with sparse synergies , 2012, AAMAS.
[26] Oskar Skibski. Steady Marginality: A Uniform Approach to Shapley Value for Games with Externalities , 2011, SAGT.
[27] Jesús Mario Bilbao,et al. Generating Functions for Computing the Myerson Value , 2002, Ann. Oper. Res..
[28] Henk Norde,et al. The Shapley Value for Partition Function Form Games , 2007, IGTR.
[29] Jeffrey D. Ullman,et al. Set Merging Algorithms , 1973, SIAM J. Comput..
[30] Albert-László Barabási,et al. Statistical mechanics of complex networks , 2001, ArXiv.
[31] Noga Alon,et al. Sum of us: strategyproof selection from the selectors , 2009, TARK XIII.
[32] Oskar Skibski,et al. The Shapley Axiomatization for Values in Partition Function Games , 2013, ArXiv.
[33] E. M. Bolger. A set of axioms for a value for partition function games , 1989 .
[34] Guillermo Owen,et al. Centrality and power in social networks: a game theoretic approach , 2003, Math. Soc. Sci..
[35] Oskar Skibski,et al. A Shapley Value-based Approach to Determine Gatekeepers in Social Networks with Applications , 2014, ECAI.
[36] Rafael Amer,et al. A connectivity game for graphs , 2004, Math. Methods Oper. Res..
[37] E. Maskin. Bargaining, Coalitions and Externalities , 2003 .
[38] Guido Moerkotte,et al. Errata for "Analysis of two existing and one new dynamic programming algorithm for the generation of optimal bushy join trees without cross products" , 2006, Proc. VLDB Endow..
[39] G. Owen,et al. A game theoretic approach to measuring degree of centrality in social networks , 1982 .
[40] Valdis E. Krebs,et al. Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells , 2001 .
[41] Michael J. Fischer,et al. An improved equivalence algorithm , 1964, CACM.
[42] H. Young. Monotonic solutions of cooperative games , 1985 .
[43] L. Shapley,et al. VALUES OF LARGE GAMES. 6: EVALUATING THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE EXACTLY , 1962 .
[44] Y. Narahari,et al. Determining the top-k nodes in social networks using the Shapley value , 2008, AAMAS.
[45] W. Lucas,et al. N‐person games in partition function form , 1963 .
[46] R. Serrano,et al. Marginal Contributions and Externalities in the Value , 2005 .
[47] Panagiotis Papapetrou,et al. A Shapley Value Approach for Influence Attribution , 2011, ECML/PKDD.
[48] David Wettstein,et al. Sharing the surplus: An extension of the Shapley value for environments with externalities , 2007, J. Econ. Theory.
[49] Nicholas R. Jennings,et al. Computational Analysis of Connectivity Games with Applications to the Investigation of Terrorist Networks , 2013, IJCAI.
[50] Michael Wooldridge,et al. Computational Analysis of Connectivity Games with Applications to Terrorist Networks , 2013, International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence.