Study on Cooperation Dynamic of Multi-enterprise Generic Technology R&D

Based on N-person evolutionary snowdrift games and public goods games model, this paper builds a game model of generic technology cooperative R&D with multi-enterprise under well-mixed population, and analyzes the affecting factors and evolution dynamic of multi-enterprise cooperation R&D. The results show that the cooperation and non-cooperation enterprise coexistence is the evolution equilibrium state of generic technology cooperation R&D system. The equilibrium state increases with the increase of industrial scale and the decrease of benefit-cost ratio. Induced cost, which become the main decision-making variables whether or not enterprise chooses cooperation R&D, can offset the inhibition effect of industry scale on generic technology cooperation R&D. Lower waiting cost motivates enterprises choose generic technology cooperation R&D strategy. The increase of external support, the difficulty of generic technology imitated, the increase of enterprises decision-makings' correctness, and the decrease of transaction costs exert positive influence on the emergence of generic technology cooperation R&D behavior. The evolution of generic technology R&D system is more sensitive to external support and the difficulty of generic technology imitated.

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