Accuracy in Adjudication

Many features of public legal systems and private schemes of dispute resolution influence the accuracy of legal outcomes, including rules of procedure and evidence, appeals, regulation of lawyers' conduct, and some aspects of substantive law. An economic inquiry into this subject is concerned with the trade-off between accuracy and cost. Much of the effort involves careful specification of the value of accuracy and cost. Much of the effort involves careful specification of the value of accuracy, which until recently has been largely taken for granted. It turns out that the benefits from greater accuracy vary greatly by context. Accordingly, the discussion separately considers problems of determining liability, assessing damages, and establishing future rights and obligations.

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