Economic Discontent and Political Behavior: The Role of Personal Grievances and Collective Economic Judgments in Congressional Voting

It is widely assumed that political action is motivated most powerfully by issues that impinge immediately and tangibly upon private life. For example, this assumption pervades the aggregate research that has reported consistent relationships between general economic conditions and congressional election outcomes (e.g., Kramer, 1971). Our analysis of individual-level data, however, indicates that voting in congressional elections from 1956 to 1976 was influenced hardly at all by personal economic grievances. Those voters unhappy with changes in their financial circumstances, or those who had recently been personally affected by unemployment, showed little inclination to punish candidates of the incumbent party for their personal misfortunes. The connection between economic conditions and politics was provided, instead, by judgments of a more general, collective kind -- e.g., by judgments regarding recent trends in general business conditions, and, more powerfully, by judgments about the relative competence of the two major parties to manage national economic problems. These collective economic judgments had little to do with privately experienced economic discontents. Rather they stemmed from voters' partisan predispositions and from their appraisal of changes in national economic conditions.

[1]  Carl P. Hensler,et al.  Whites' Opposition to “Busing”: Self-interest or Symbolic Politics? , 1979, American Political Science Review.

[2]  M. Weatherford.  Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: Class Differences in the Political Response to Recession , 1978 .

[3]  M. Fiorina.  Economic Retrospective Voting in American National Elections: A Micro-Analysis* , 1978 .

[4]  Tom R. Tyler,et al.  Political System Support and Public Response to the Energy Crisis , 1978 .

[5]  P. Sniderman,et al.  Coping: The Ethic of Self-Reliance , 1977 .

[6]  Alfred Slote.  Termination: The Closing at Baker Plant , 1977 .

[7]  P. Meehl.  The Selfish Voter Paradox and the Thrown-Away Vote Argument , 1977, American Political Science Review.

[8]  J. Wides.  Self-Perceived Economic Change and Political Orientations , 1976 .

[9]  John W. Gorman,et al.  Comment: What Have You Done for Me Lately? Toward An Investment Theory of Voting , 1976, American Political Science Review.

[10]  Robert S. Erikson,et al.  The Influence of Newspaper Endorsements in Presidential Elections: The Case of 1964 , 1976 .

[11]  James A. Stimson.  Public Support for American Presidents A Cyclical Model , 1976 .

[12]  Jacob Cohen,et al.  Applied multiple regression/correlation analysis for the behavioral sciences , 1979 .

[13]  A. Meltzer,et al.  The Effects of Economic Policies on Votes for the Presidency: Some Evidence from Recent Elections , 1975, Journal law and economy.

[14]  Allan H. Meltzer,et al.  The Effect of Aggregate Economic Variables on Congressional Elections , 1975, American Political Science Review.

[15]  James E. Piereson.  Presidential Popularity and Midterm Voting at Different Electoral Levels , 1975 .

[16]  Edward R. Tufte,et al.  Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections , 1975, American Political Science Review.

[17]  John H. Aldrich,et al.  Probing the Bounds of Conventional Wisdom. A Comparison of Regression, Probit, and Discriminant Analysis* , 1975 .

[18]  R. Fair.  On Controlling the Economy to Win Elections , 1975 .

[19]  Susan J. Lepper.  Voting behavior and aggregate policy targets , 1974 .

[20]  George J. Stigler,et al.  General Economic Conditions and National Elections , 1973 .

[21]  G. Kramer.  Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964 , 1971, American Political Science Review.

[22]  W. Hirsch.  Los Angeles : viability and prospects for metropolitan leadership , 1971 .

[23]  Donald E. Stokes.  Some Dynamic Elements of Contests for the Presidency , 1966, American Political Science Review.