The blind leading the blind?

In his ambitious, macroscopic, and provocative book, Henriques begins by using the parable of the blind men and the elephant to describe the fragmentation of psychological knowledge and the quest for greater unity. (For those unfamiliar with this parable, several blind men try to discern the nature of the object before them, each with a different conclusion based on whether he has grabbed the elephant’s trunk, leg, etc.) Henriques concludes that the object, for human psychology, is justification (i.e., how individuals justify their actions to one another, leading to the creation of collective justification systems). He then tries to convince the reader he has assembled an “ultimate” conceptual framework. In other words, Henriques does not interpret the parable as a cautionary tale about the parochial nature of individual perspectives, which thus necessitates legitimate dialogue and an unassuming attitude toward the perspectives of others. Instead, he has taken on the arguably impossible task of occupying the position of the sighted parable narrator; and, furthermore, of convincing the reader they can adopt his framework and share his transcendent perspective. Henriques suggests the reader would then be able to see the “elephant,” which he formally articulates in a four-part model, including his “Tree of Knowledge” system, “Behavioural Investment Theory,” “Justification Hypothesis,” and “Influence Matrix.” The book includes a chapter on each. While a critique of the merits and limitations of these components is beyond the scope of this review, I will address the bigger question of whether the book succeeds in its promise to deliver a “new unified theory of psychology,” or “theoretical system that organizes and explains empirical findings and provides psychologists with a shared language and conceptual frame to understand their subject matter” (p. 5) and a way to “assimilate and integrate [the insights of midlevel theories] into a comprehensive set of ideas that articulates a clearer picture of the human condition” (p. 13). With regard to the first purpose, is Henriques’ theory new? While the gestalt of the theory is clearly original, many of its elements appear to be modifications or elaborations of existing theories, leaving the reader to discern whether they are sufficiently necessary. For example, he provides arguments in favour of redefining “worldviews,” “belief systems,” “memes,” and similar constructs as “justification systems” but the utility of 483380 TAP23510.1177/0959354313483380Theory & PsychologyReview 2013