Dynamic label binding at run-time

Information flow control allows enforcement of end-to-end confidentiality policies but has been difficult to put in practice. This paper introduces a pragmatic new approach for tracking information flow while the process is running at the same time applying dynamic label binding. The underlying implementation mechanism uses machine code instruction stream modification to track individual data movements and manipulations within the address space of an application. This gives the ability to precisely determine all information flow causing operations and apply controls that do not overly restrict what computations can be performed.

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