Turret Lock-on in an Engage or Retreat Game

In this paper we model and analyze a scenario in the two dimensional plane involving a mobile Attacker and stationary Defender. There are two possibilities for termination: the Attacker can collide with the Defender (engagement) or maneuver to a safe zone away from the Defender (retreat). The Defender is equipped with a directional turret which it can rotate with a bounded rate. If the turret is aligned with the Attacker's position, the Defender has a lock on the Attacker and may choose to fire on the Attacker. Thus, whether engaging or retreating, the Attacker has incentive to evade the turret's line of sight and thereby avoid being locked-on. In the case of retreat, if lock-on occurs the Defender cooperates with the Attacker by withholding fire to allow the Attacker to retreat. However, if the Attacker chooses to engage and lock-on occurs, the Defender will open fire on the Attacker. We model the scenario as a set of differential games with different cost functionals depending on the type of termination. The agents are assumed to have full state information. In the case that the Defender can align with the Attacker the pre-and post-lock portions of the game are solved individually and stitched together. The equilibrium strategies are derived in each case, and a partitioning of the state space wherein a particular termination condition is optimal is constructed.