Multiagent System Platform for Auction Simulations

I have developed a multiagent system platform that provides a valuable complement to the alternative auction research methods. The platform facilitates the development of heterogeneous agents and provides an experimental environment that is under the experimenter's complete control. Simulations with alternative learning methods results in impulse balance learning as the most promising approach for auctions.

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