www.econstor.eu A Dynamic Theory of Parliamentary Democracy1

This paper presents a dynamic model of election, government formation, and legislation in a parliamentary democracy with proportional representation in which the policy chosen in one period becomes the status quo for the next period. The electorate votes strategically by taking into account the likely governments that parties would form and the policies they would choose as a function of the status quo. The status quo thus a¤ects both the election outcomes and the bargaining power of the parties during government formation. A formateur party thus has incentives to strategically position the current policy to gain an advantage in both the next election and the subsequent bargaining over government formation and policy choice. These incentives can give rise to centrifugal forces that result in policies that are outside the Pareto set of the parties. JEL Code: D7, C7, H1.

[1]  Allan Drazen,et al.  Political Economy in Macroeconomics , 2018 .

[2]  G. Tabellini,et al.  Electoral Rules and Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies , 2007 .

[3]  Marco Battaglini,et al.  Inefficiency in Legislative Policy-Making: A Dynamic Analysis , 2005 .

[4]  Anastassios Kalandrakis,et al.  A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game , 2004, J. Econ. Theory.

[5]  Antonio Merlo,et al.  A Structural Model of Government Formation , 2001 .

[6]  I. Budge,et al.  Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945-1998 , 2001 .

[7]  D. Diermeier,et al.  An Empirical Investigation of Coalitional Bargaining Procedures , 2001 .

[8]  D. P. Baron,et al.  Elections, Governments, and Parliaments in Proportional Representation Systems , 2001 .

[9]  Roberto Perotti,et al.  Electoral Systems and Public Spending , 2001, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[10]  Antonio Merlo,et al.  Government Turnover in Parliamentary Democracies , 2000, J. Econ. Theory.

[11]  Marco Pagano,et al.  The Political Economy of Corporate Governance , 1999 .

[12]  Kathleen Bawn.  Voter Responses to Electoral Complexity: Ticket Splitting, Rational Voters and Representation in the Federal Republic of Germany , 1999, British Journal of Political Science.

[13]  Torsten Persson,et al.  The Size and the Scope of Government: Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians , 1998 .

[14]  T. Feddersen,et al.  Cohesion in Legislatures and the Vote of Confidence Procedure , 1998, American Political Science Review.

[15]  Torsten Persson,et al.  Comparative Politics and Public Finance , 1997, Journal of Political Economy.

[16]  G. Cox.  Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems , 1997 .

[17]  David P. Baron,et al.  A Dynamic Theory of Collective Goods Programs , 1996, American Political Science Review.

[18]  Torsten Persson,et al.  Why a Stubborn Conservative would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-Inconsistent Preferences , 1989 .

[19]  J. Banks,et al.  Elections, Coalitions, and Legislative Outcomes , 1988, American Political Science Review.

[20]  W. A. Wallis,et al.  Majority Rule Dynamics with Endogenous Status Quo ∗ , 2007 .

[21]  John Duggan.  A Dynamic Model of Legislative Bargaining , 2006 .

[22]  Alessandro Lizzeri,et al.  The provision of public goods under alternative electoral incentives , 2001 .

[23]  G. Tabellini,et al.  Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy , 2000 .

[24]  Steven M. Delue.  Minority government and majority rule , 1991 .