Incentive compatibility and informational requirements

[1]  K. Arrow.  Control in Large Organizations , 1964 .

[2]  Theodore Groves,et al.  Incentives in Teams , 1973 .

[3]  A. Gibbard.  Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result , 1973 .

[4]  Stanley Reiter,et al.  The Knowledge Revealed by an Allocation Process and the Informational Size of the Message Space , 1974 .

[5]  S. Reiter,et al.  The informational size of message spaces , 1974 .

[6]  M. Satterthwaite.  Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions , 1975 .

[7]  L. Hurwicz.  Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: The design of resource allocation mechanisms , 1977 .

[8]  Mark A Walker,et al.  On the Informational Size of Message Spaces , 1977 .

[9]  L. Hurwicz.  Studies in Resource Allocation Processes: Optimality and informational efficiency in resource allocation processes , 1977 .

[10]  L. Hurwicz.  On informationally decentralized systems , 1977 .

[11]  Stanley Reiter,et al.  Information and Performance in the (New)2 Welfare Economics , 1977 .

[12]  Hiroaki Osana,et al.  On the informational size of message spaces for resource allocation processes , 1978 .

[13]  C. d'Aspremont,et al.  Incentives and incomplete information , 1979 .

[14]  Jerry R. Green,et al.  Incentives in public decision-making , 1979 .

[15]  Bengt Holmstrom,et al.  GROVES' SCHEME ON RESTRICTED DOMAINS , 1979 .

[16]  E. Maskin,et al.  The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility , 1979 .

[17]  Fumitaka Sato,et al.  On the informational size of message spaces for resource allocation processes in economies with public goods , 1981 .