Setting the agenda: Electoral competition, commitment of policy, and issue salience

By committing policy, an incumbent in effect disowns an issue; when she maintains policy flexibility, the issue remains electorally salient. Electoral competition shapes political commitment decisions and collapses the multi-dimensional issue space into a low-dimensional space of electorally salient issues.

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