Organizational Commitment in a Mixed Oligopoly: Agricultural Cooperatives and Investor-Owned Firms
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A number of agricultural cooperativeorganizations—prominent examples includeTri-Valley Growers and the SaskatchewanWheat Pool—currently face considerablefinancialand organizationalchallenges.Externally, these challenges include a grow-ing concentration in a number of sectors (e.g.,beef and pork packing) and a greater preva-lence of vertical integration and contracts.Internally, cooperatives (co-ops) encountergreater heterogeneity among members,greater property rights problems (Cook), anda decline in member commitment (Fulton1999). This latter factor has been cited asone reason for the declining market shareand poor financialperformance of a numberof co-ops (Fulton and Gibbings).The purpose of this article is to examinethe issue of member commitment in the con-text of a mixed oligopoly where co-ops andinvestor-owned firms (IOFs) compete witheach other in supplying a consumer good.
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