A survey of computational economics applied to computer networks

The perspective taken in this report is to provide background information on recent efforts toward the convergence of computer science (both theoretical, dealing with algorithm complexity, and applied, dealing with the implementation of algorithms) and micro-economics techniques. We term computational economics the science that explores the intersection of economics and computation. Similarly to [33], our intent is to offer the tools for systems’ engineers to design algorithms capable of supporting the desired system-wide goals taking into account the presence of selfish elements. We take the stance that selfishness is an obstacle to system designers goals and survey techniques such as payments and digital reputation, to name a few, as a way to overcome this obstacle. We define a unified framework to describe computational economics problems applied to computer networks.

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