Value of Free Speech

Commentators and jurists have long searched for an explanation of the true value served by the first amendment's protection of free speech. This issue certainly has considerable intellectual appeal, and the practical stakes are also high. For the answer we give to the question what value does free speech serve may well determine the extent of constitutional protection to be given to such forms of expression as literature, art, science, commercial speech, and speech related to the political process. There seems to be general agreement that the Supreme Court has failed in its attempts to devise a coherent theory of free expression.1 These efforts have been characterized by "a pattern of aborted doctrines, shifting rationales, and frequent changes of position by individual Justices." 2 Commentators, by contrast, have been eager to elaborate upon their unified theories of the value of free speech. Professor Emerson, probably the leading modern theorist of free speech, has recognized four separate values served by the first amendment's protection of expression: (1) "assuring individual self-fulfillment;" 3 (2) "advancing knowledge and discovering truth;" 4 (3) "provid[ing] for participation in decisionmaking by all members of society;" 1 and (4) "achieving a more adaptable and hence a more stable community,... maintaining the precarious balance between healthy cleavage and necessary consensus." ' Al-