Economic efficiency requires interaction

Abstract We study the necessity of interaction between individuals for obtaining approximately efficient economic allocations. We view this as a formalization of Hayek's classic point of view that focuses on the information transfer advantages that markets have relative to centralized planning. We study two settings: combinatorial auctions with unit demand bidders (bipartite matching) and combinatorial auctions with subadditive bidders. In both settings we prove that non-interactive protocols require exponentially larger communication costs than do interactive ones, even ones that only use a modest amount of interaction.

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