HMAKE: Legacy-Compliant Multi-factor Authenticated Key Exchange from Historical Data

In this paper, we introduce two lightweight historical data based multi-factor authenticated key exchange (HMAKE) protocols in the random oracle model. Our HMAKE protocols use a symmetric secret key, as their first authentication factor, together with their second authentication factor, historical data exchanged between the two parties in the past, and the third authentication factor, a set of secret tags associated with the historical data, to establish a secure communication channel between the client and the server. A remarkable security feature of HMAKE is bounded historical tag leakage resilience, which means that (informally speaking) if a small portion of the secret tags is leaked to an adversary, it will not affect the security of one HMAKE protocol with an overwhelming probability. Our first HMAKE protocol can provide static bounded leakage resilience, meaning that the secret tags are leaked at the beginning of the security game. To enhance its security, our second HMAKE protocol makes use of our first protocol as a compiler to transform any passively secure two-message key exchange protocol to an actively secure HMAKE protocol with perfect forward secrecy, and therefore it can be secure even if the historical tags are compromised adaptively by an attacker. In addition to the strong security properties we achieved, our protocols can potentially have great impacts in practice: they are efficient in computation, and they are compatible with legacy devices in cyber-physical systems.

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