A novel hardware trojan detection with chip ID based on relative time delays

This paper introduces a hardware Trojan detection method using Chip ID which is generated by Relative Time-Delays (RTD) of sensor chains and the effectiveness of RTD is verified by post-layout simulations. The rank of time-delays of the sensor chains would be changed in Trojan-inserted chip. RTD is an accurate approach targeting to all kinds of Trojans, since it is based on the RELATIVE relationship between the time-delays rather than the absolute values, which are hard to be measured and will change with the fabricate process. RTD needs no golden chip, because the RELATIVE values would not change in most situations. Thus the genuine ID can be generated by simulator. The sensor chains can be inserted into a layout utilizing unused spaces, so RTD is a low-cost solution. A Trojan with 4x minimum NMOS is placed in different places of the chip. The behavior of the chip is obtained by using transient based post-layout simulation. All the Trojans are detected AND located, thus the effectiveness of RTD is verified.

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