Propositional attitude framework requirements

Abstract The purpose of this paper is to focus attention on various important aspects and problems of propositional attitude representation in the hope of engendering fruitful discussion on these topics, and in particular in the hope that such discussion might lead to a determination of useful criteria for evaluating the merits and drawbacks of individual systems. As such, the paper does not purport to offer ‘the solutions’ to the mentioned problems, nor are the problems discussed here intended to be an exhaustive catalogue of the problems that must be solved by successful systems. The problems are, however, advanced as a useful set of criteria for evaluating systems by considering which problems are tackled, and how they are tackled.

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