Global environmental problems, efficiency and limited altruism

Global environmental problems are often assumed to imply extensive inefficiencies since there is no global authority corresponding to the government at a national level. This paper shows, on the contrary, that rich countries in a free unregulated market may still undertake globally efficient abatement investments, given the existence of limited nonpaternalistic altruism.

[1]  E. Fehr,et al.  Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of Reciprocity , 2000, SSRN Electronic Journal.

[2]  Theodore C. Bergstrom,et al.  Systems of Benevolent Utility Functions , 1999 .

[3]  G. Stigler.  The Theory of Price , 1948 .

[4]  George Loewenstein,et al.  Choosing the Wrong Pond: Social Comparisons in Negotiations That Reflect a Self-Serving Bias , 1996 .

[5]  Ted O’Donoghue,et al.  Doing It Now or Later , 1999 .

[6]  Michael Jones-Lee,et al.  The Value of Life and Safety , 1982 .

[7]  M. Cropper,et al.  Sulfur Dioxide Control by Electric Utilities: What Are the Gains from Trade? , 1998, Journal of Political Economy.

[8]  Theodore C. Bergstrom,et al.  When is a Man's Life Worth More Than His Human Capital? , 1982 .

[9]  S. Fiske,et al.  The Handbook of Social Psychology , 1935 .

[10]  Equity and social considerations related to climate change , 1994 .

[11]  J. Andreoni.  Giving with Impure Altruism: Applications to Charity and Ricardian Equivalence , 1989, Journal of Political Economy.

[12]  J. Bruce,et al.  Climate change, 1995 : economic and social dimensions of climate change , 1997 .

[13]  Wallace E. Oates,et al.  The theory of environmental policy , 1976 .

[14]  David C. Ribar,et al.  Altruistic and Joy‐of‐Giving Motivations in Charitable Behavior , 2002, Journal of Political Economy.

[15]  P. Samuelson.  The Pure Theory of Public Expanditure , 1954 .

[16]  Drew Fudenberg,et al.  The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information , 1986 .

[17]  U. Fischbacher,et al.  On the Nature of Fair Behavior , 1999 .