How Costly Is External Financing? Evidence from a Structural Estimation

We apply simulated method of moments to a dynamic model to infer the magnitude of financing costs. The model features endogenous investment, distributions, leverage, and default. The corporation faces taxation, costly bankruptcy, and linear-quadratic equity flotation costs. For large (small) firms, estimated marginal equity flotation costs start at 5.0% (10.7%) and bankruptcy costs equal to 8.4% (15.1%) of capital. Estimated financing frictions are higher for low-dividend firms and those identified as constrained by the Cleary and Whited-Wu indexes. In simulated data, many common proxies for financing constraints actually decrease when we increase financing cost parameters. Copyright 2007 by The American Finance Association.

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