Thirteen Reasons Why the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves Process Is Not Practical

In theory, the mathematically elegant Vickrey-Clarke-Groves process offers perfect efficiency with dominant truth-revealing strategies. However, it has many serious practical problems. This paper describes these problems and argues that research that aims to maintain the dominant truth-revealing strategies while compromising on the other practical issues is of limited practical value.

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